Dear Mr. Chairman,
Congratulations on your appointment to this responsible post and wish you success in your work. You can count on the support of the Russian delegation.
Mr. Chairman, dear colleagues,
The Russian Federation reaffirms its continued commitment to the obligations under the Convention on “Inhumane” Weapons (CCW) and stands for the full implementation of its provisions. We are convinced that it is at the site of this Convention that it is possible to ensure a reasonable balance between humanitarian concerns and legitimate defense interests of national security of States through consensus-based decision-making. The YPG regime has in practice confirmed its real ability to respond to humanitarian threats, as well as its high adaptability to changing conditions of warfare.
In this regard, we believe that the solution to problems related to the use of conventional weapons lies exclusively in the plane of conscientious implementation of the existing provisions of the CCW and its protocols, as well as the widespread use of political and diplomatic means of conflict resolution.
The strengthening of the CCW and its five Protocols directly depends on the pace of their universalization. We call on all States that have not yet done so to become parties to the CCW, including all its Protocols.
The Russian Federation is fully contributing to the implementation of the Convention. We strictly follow the current mechanism for compliance with the CCW and its Protocols, including the decision adopted at the 2011 Review Conference (CA) and confirmed at the 2021 CA on its strengthening. We provide timely annual reporting on the Convention as a whole, as well as under Amended Protocol II (DP-2) and Protocol V (P-5). We actively participate in all annual events within the framework of the CCW and its protocols.
We strictly observe Protocol I to the CCW on undetectable fragments. We are convinced of the need for all UN Member States to join it.
We emphasize the firm observance by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation of DP-2, which establishes an effective mechanism against the improper use of landmines, which are for many States a legitimate and necessary means of ensuring national security, as well as P-5, concerning explosive remnants of war. The Russian Armed Forces, as well as the Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Disaster Relief of the Russian Federation, make a significant contribution to the implementation of the provisions of the CCW and its protocols, including in terms of mine clearance and clearing of any explosive objects both on our territory and abroad (for example, in Laos). We are ready to share the experience and best practices acquired in the framework of humanitarian demining, as well as to develop cooperation in this area with all interested countries.
We reaffirm our commitment to our obligations under Protocol III (P-3) to the CCW on incendiary weapons. We consider calls for a revision of the provisions of this document to be counterproductive. We see no reason to separate the discussion on P-3 in a separate direction at the CCW site. It is important to focus on more pressing issues – first of all, on the conscientious and clearer implementation of the current provisions of this Protocol.
We confirm our restrained attitude towards the resumption of independent expert work on landmines other than anti-personnel mines (NMOS) within the framework of the CCW. Such mines are a legitimate means of defense, and any attempts to present their use as a “special humanitarian threat” are divorced from reality. We are convinced that the potential humanitarian risks associated with these mines should be resolved within the framework of the already existing norms of international humanitarian law (IHL), in particular DP-2. We do not see the need for an exchange of best practices in the application of DP-2 standards in relation to NMOS.
We also consider calls for the introduction of issues of the use of explosive ordnance in densely populated areas to the CCW site to be untenable, since their use is already sufficiently regulated by IHL norms and does not correspond to the subject of the Convention. At the same time, work on the topic of improvised explosive devices remains in demand. We advocate the continuation of consideration of this issue within the framework of DP-2 in accordance with the subject and objectives of the CCW.
We confirm our readiness to continue discussing the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems (SAS) within the framework of the relevant Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) as an optimal platform based on a discussion mandate and the principle of consensus. We proceed from the fact that the current norms of international law, including IHL, are fully applicable to the SAS and do not need to be adapted to the specifics of these weapons systems.
We welcome the adoption at the Sixth CCW Meeting of financial rules designed to ensure the long-term and sustainable functioning of the Convention. We proceed from the fact that any expenditures from the budget of the CCW can be carried out exclusively with the approval of the States Parties to the CCW. We note with satisfaction and gratitude the work of the Implementation Support Group.
The Russian Federation confirms its commitment to a constructive, results-oriented dialogue with all interested parties.
Thanks for attention.
