Mr. Chairperson,
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) became the first international agreement to outlaw an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. This was a significant step forward in advancing the process of general and complete disarmament, reducing the threat of biological agents used for weapons purposes. The Russian Federation, as BTWC depository state, consistently implements all of its provisions.
However, even after half a century of existence of the Convention, it is too early to say that the issue of biological weapons is completely removed from the agenda of the world community. In the context of fulfilment of obligations under the BTWC, the uncovered facts pertaining to the implementation of a military biological programme in Ukraine with support of the Pentagon and affiliated entities, including private companies, warrant closer attention. The analysis of available documents indicates the development of bioweapon components in close proximity to the Russian borders.
Detailed information about this BTWC violating activity is contained in the Outcome Report of the Parliamentary Commission on Investigation into the Circumstances Related to Creation of Biological Laboratories by US Specialists on the Territory of Ukraine, which we circulated among BTWC States Parties in 2023, as well as in the relevant working paper of the Russian Federation that can be found on the Convention web portal.
The legitimate concerns regarding the aforementioned activities of the United States and Ukraine formally raised by the Russian side at the Consultative Meeting under Article V of the BTWC and meetings in the UN Security Council, as well as at the Ninth Review Conference of the BTWC and sessions of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BTWC, have not received a response. These matters remain open and need to be addressed. We shall further demand that the American and Ukrainian sides take action to rectify the situation, thus eliminating this significant irritant, which is detrimental to the BTWC regime and hinders the work within the Convention framework.
The situation around Ukraine clearly validates the claims the Russian Federation has openly and continuously made in connection with military biological activities carried out under the guise of cooperation for peaceful purposes with the most direct assistance and participation of the US Department of Defence in laboratories outside American territory, including in the republics of the former USSR, far from the North American continent and near the Russian borders. The situation is aggravated by the fact that information on programmes and projects underway outside the national territory and their funding is still missing in the US reports submitted annually under the BTWC’ confidence-building measures, which were developed by States Parties “to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguity, doubt and suspicion”.
All this confirms the need for consolidated efforts by the international community to strengthen the BTWC regime. We insist that the efficiency of the Convention would be significantly higher if a universal, legally binding and non-discriminatory protocol covering all articles of the Convention with an effective verification mechanism is adopted. This point of view is shared by the overwhelming majority of States Parties. The assertions by some delegations that the BTWC is allegedly unverifiable and that work in this area is futile are completely contrary to the conclusions of the experts of the VEREX group and the Ad Hoc Group of Experts, who concluded that verification measures can be useful in providing confidence that countries are complying with their obligations under the Convention. We have covered this subject in detail in the relevant Russian working paper containing specific proposals on the methodology for an effective verification mechanism, which can be found on the BTWC web portal.
We welcome the joint steps taken by the States Parties to the BTWC to strengthen the Convention institutionally within the framework of the specialized Working Group established by the decision of the Ninth BTWC Review Conference along the lines of Russia’s proposal. We believe that Russia’s initiatives designed to effectively strengthen the Convention regime are fully in line with the Group’s agenda. They include creating mobile biomedical units within the Convention to render assistance in case of the use of biological weapons and to help combat epidemics of various origins; introducing an investigative mechanism with regard to the alleged breach of obligations under the BTWC in line with Article VI; and establishing the Scientific Advisory Committee which would analyse scientific and technical developments relevant to the BTWC and provide recommendations to States Parties; as well as strengthening confidence-building measures within the BTWC by providing States Parties with information on military and biological activities outside national territory.
We see the activities related to strengthening the BTWC regime as an opportunity to unite the efforts of the international community around a pragmatic, non-discriminatory and future-oriented agenda. Previous meetings of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the BTWC have demonstrated that there are some issues the States Parties are able to reach consensus on. In this context, we share the intense interest the majority of the delegations demonstrate concerning the issue of international cooperation and assistance under Article X of the Convention. We thank everybody who has been keenly interested in the workshop organized by Russia in the margins of the Group’s fifth meeting dedicated to the advanced training courses for biosecurity and biosafety specialists and in the presentation of the potential of Russian core research and development institutions within the framework of the BTWC.
Mr. Chairperson,
Russia is convinced of the need for the international community to intensify its efforts to strengthen the expert and technical capacity of the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM). Particular attention should be paid to the Mechanism’s basic principles and procedures which, except for the technical appendices selectively amended in 2007, have not been updated since their approval by the UNGA resolution 45/57C of 4 December 1990. Designed more than 30 years ago, they do not quite meet the current realities of chemical and biological security. New challenges and threats have emerged, as well as a whole range of technical and methodological innovations that could enhance the effectiveness of the UNSGM.
As is known, to facilitate the implementation of this goal, the Russian Federation sent a message to the UN Secretary-General calling for a review of the existing UNSGM principles and procedures with a view to updating them. The whole group of countries supported the idea by aligning with the Joint Statement in Support of the Efforts to Strengthen the UNSGM which would be also communicated to the MSP. Their voice cannot be ignored. We would expect that the UN Secretary-General will promptly begin the relevant review with the help of consulting experts and taking into account the proposals from the State Parties.
In conclusion, we would like to emphasize that the Russian delegation is ready for the closest cooperation to achieve concrete practical results. We hope that taking into account each other’s interests and willingness to compromise will serve a reliable basis for achieving workable and effective agreements within the BTWC.
Thank you for your attention.
