Question: 2022 has become an anniversary year for Russian-Azerbaijani and Russian-Armenian relations. How do you assess the results of the year and what are your plans for the future in the context of the development of Moscow’s bilateral ties with Baku and Yerevan? What are the problematic issues in relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia that concern the Russian side?
Answer: Indeed, the outgoing year was special in our relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia. It seems that we have managed to adequately celebrate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations and the 25th anniversary of the signing of bilateral friendship treaties.
With regard to Azerbaijan, it is symbolic that it was in the jubilee year that we were able to bring our relations to a qualitatively new – allied – level. On February 22, Presidents V.V. Putin and I.G.Aliyev signed a corresponding Declaration in Moscow. This important document has fixed the guidelines for the development of our relations for years to come. The alliance was the result of many years of joint work that we built with our Azerbaijani friends based on the principles of mutual respect and consideration of each other’s interests. The determining factor is the unprecedented high level of personal relations between the heads of our states. This year, our presidents held six face-to-face meetings and 10 telephone conversations.
The anniversary events were held with dignity. These include the Days of Azerbaijan festival in Moscow, mutual museum exhibitions, concerts and film screenings, the release of commemorative stamps and a collection of documents.
We have concluded a solid package of intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements with our partners, including on cooperation in the field of international information security, countering the legalization of criminal proceeds, on the development of shipbuilding and border checkpoints. Work on the development of the legal framework will continue.
The turnover is breaking records. By the end of the year, it may reach $4 billion.
After the pandemic pause, contacts at all levels have noticeably intensified. Only in recent months, Chairman of the State Duma V.V.Volodin, Chairman of the Government M.V.Mishustin, heads of a number of large regions (Astrakhan, Dagestan, Tatarstan) have visited Baku, the 11th Russian-Azerbaijani Interregional Forum was successfully held. The first (in March in the Gusar district of Azerbaijan) and the second (in September in Nizhny Novgorod) youth initiative forums were successfully held.
We attach great importance to cooperation within the framework of the common cultural space inherited by Russia and Azerbaijan. It is very gratifying that the societies of both countries traditionally maintain a high demand for cultural and humanitarian events. By the way, a special event of the Ministry of Culture of Russia is planned to be held in Baku in 2023 – a Museum roadshow with a presentation of leading Russian museums, a conference of heads of museums of Russia and Azerbaijan and an exhibition of digital copies of objects of the Museum Fund of Russia.
As for the things that bother us. As you know, at the October summit in Sochi, the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia noted in a joint statement the key contribution of the Russian peacekeeping contingent to ensuring security in its deployment zone, the relevance of its efforts to stabilize the situation in the region. We would like the Azerbaijani media and social networks to take into account the above assessments shared by the Azerbaijani leadership when covering the activities of the RMK. To be fair, it must be said that our partners also had complaints about the “biased” presentation by a number of Russian media of stories concerning the Armenian-Azerbaijani normalization.
We are discussing all these topics with our Azerbaijani colleagues in a respectful and professional manner. In particular, they were touched upon during the recent talks of Foreign Ministers Sergey Lavrov and D.A. Bayramov. We are ready to continue searching and finding mutually acceptable solutions even on the most difficult issues.
The outgoing year has also turned out to be a landmark in relations with Armenia. An important milestone was the first official visit of Prime Minister N.V. Pashinyan to our country, during which on April 19 the leaders adopted a Joint statement that consolidated the privileged nature of allied relations between Moscow and Yerevan. As part of the anniversary, a series of festive events were held – exhibitions of archival and photographic materials, cross-cultural days, the publication of a collection of contractual and legal framework.
Intense contacts at various levels continued throughout the year. In October-November, President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin visited Armenia, who had detailed conversations with the Armenian leadership on the sidelines of the CSTO and EAEU meetings. N.V. Pashinyan visited Moscow, Vladivostok, Nizhny Novgorod, Novosibirsk and Sochi in connection with various events in Russia.
A regular session of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic Cooperation is scheduled before the end of the year. Business missions are regularly sent to Yerevan, interregional and youth forums are held. Relations between the subjects of the Russian Federation and the marzes of the Republic of Armenia have significantly advanced.
We will start the year 2023 with the 36th meeting of the bilateral Inter-Parliamentary Commission on Cooperation. We are preparing to organize a large-scale Educational forum in the Republic.
If we talk about the issues that concern us, these are mainly due to the annoying attempts of the West to “drive a wedge” into the Russian-Armenian friendship. We see how emissaries from Washington and Brussels have recently become more active in the Republic, as well as all sorts of pro–Western structures that are trying to turn the authorities and the population against Russia, but in reality they are acting against the national interests of Armenia. We hope that, as before, we will be able to resolve all the issues that arise in honest and frank communication with our Armenian allies.
Question: How is the implementation of the trilateral agreements of the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia going, including the unblocking of transport and economic ties, the preparation of a peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan, the process of delimitation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, public contacts?
Answer: At the Sochi summit on October 31, the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia reaffirmed their commitment to strict compliance with the trilateral agreements of November 9, 2020, January 11 and November 26, 2021, which, together with the statement on the results of the aforementioned Sochi meeting, form a roadmap for the comprehensive normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations.
Once again, I would like to emphasize the key role of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in ensuring security in its deployment zone. This was particularly noted by the leaders of the three countries at the summit in Sochi and emphasized the relevance of the efforts of our peacekeepers to stabilize the situation in the region.
As for unblocking transport and economic ties between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the 11th meeting of the Trilateral Working Group was held in Moscow on December 6 under the joint chairmanship of the Deputy Prime Ministers of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. The issues of railway construction, development of railway communication and organization of transportation between the three countries and in the region were discussed in detail. The Azerbaijani and Armenian sides noted Russia’s positive role in efforts to unblock transport communications.
We are ready to continue to provide all possible assistance to the delimitation of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and the preparation of a peace treaty between Baku and Yerevan, including through the organization of relevant high-level trilateral meetings on the territory of Russia. These processes, which are extremely sensitive for both sides, require the search for mutually acceptable and long-term solutions. Disclosing details of negotiations or discussing the positions of the parties in the press does not always benefit the cause.
We are also preparing regular contacts between the public and expert communities of the two countries. This important area of joint efforts is designed to contribute to the formation of an atmosphere of trust in relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The trilateral inter-parliamentary dialogue, the initiative to launch which was supported at the Sochi summit, can also contribute to this process. The dates of the relevant meetings will be announced in due course.
Question: In September, there was a serious aggravation of the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. Yerevan has asked for assistance from the European Union and the OSCE, inviting their missions. How do you assess this decision of the Armenian side? Is sending a CSTO monitoring mission to the region still on the agenda? Don’t you think that Washington and Brussels are taking the initiative from Moscow in mediating between Yerevan and Baku?
Answer: I would like to remind you that it was thanks to the efforts of the RMK command in contacts with both sides that it was possible to stop the September escalation of tension in the area of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. At the request of the Armenian side, a number of steps were also promptly taken through the CSTO, including the convening of an extraordinary session of the CSTO Security Council, sending the Secretary General of the Organization and the Chief of the Joint Staff to assess the situation on the ground, working out the dispatch of a CSTO monitoring mission to the border areas of Armenia. The situation in the border area was discussed in detail at the annual meeting of the CSTO Security Council in Yerevan on November 23. According to our assessment, if the Armenian side is interested, the necessary decisions in this regard can be taken promptly, with the understanding that most of the CSTO member states see a long-term settlement of border problems between Baku and Yerevan through the implementation of trilateral agreements of the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, including the launch of practical and rhythmic work of the commission on border delimitation.
Now about how we feel about the actions of our Western colleagues. We continue to record their insistence on joining our trilateral formats with Azerbaijan and Armenia. And no matter how much Brussels and Washington try to imagine otherwise, behind this is the desire to squeeze Russia out of Transcaucasia, and not really and sincerely help in establishing peace and stability in the region. It is significant that Washington and Brussels are afraid to even mention Russia in a positive way and recognize the key importance of the trilateral agreements for the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. In line with such assessments, we perceive the activities of the temporary EU monitoring mission in Armenia, as well as attempts to organize the dispatch of an OSCE mission to the region bypassing the consensus rule.
Question: Does the format of the 3+3 Consultative Regional Platform (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia plus Russia, Iran, Turkey) remain relevant? When can the second meeting take place and is it possible for Georgia to participate in it?
Answer: We are convinced of the relevance of the Consultative Regional Platform “3+3” in the interests of expanding mutually beneficial cooperation between the participating countries.
Let me remind you that during the founding meeting in Moscow in December 2021, it was decided to focus on topics of common interest – the development of trade, economic, transport, cultural and humanitarian ties, as well as the fight against common challenges and threats. We attach particular importance to the disclosure of the transit potential of the region, which will be facilitated by the restoration of transport routes. Of great interest are the prospects for joint project activities in the modernization of infrastructure not only in the field of transport, but also energy. Such cooperation will contribute to confidence-building in the region through the establishment of comprehensive regional ties, will become one of the pillars in supporting the processes of Armenian-Azerbaijani and Armenian-Turkish normalization.
Currently, the organizational modalities of the second meeting “3 +3” are being worked out. We hope that it will take place in the coming months. Judging by the mood of all participants, an invitation to it can also be sent to Georgia.
Question: On December 1 of this year, the Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, V.V. Volodin, visited Sukhum. On December 6, a meeting of the Russian-Abkhaz IPC was held under the co-chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister A.V. Novak and Prime Minister A.Z. Ankvab. What are the main results? Are contacts planned at the same level with the Republic of South Ossetia?
Answer: Abkhazia and South Ossetia are our closest allies, relations with them are developing dynamically and progressively. There is an active delegation exchange between our countries, which allows us to quickly and effectively resolve topical issues on the bilateral agenda.
The inter-parliamentary dialogue has also noticeably intensified recently. On October 4, the new Speaker of the People’s Assembly of Abkhazia, L.N.Ashuba, paid an official visit to Moscow, and on December 1, the Chairman of the State Duma, V.V. Volodin, paid a return visit to Sukhum, held detailed and substantive talks with President A.G.Bzhania and his colleague.
In addition to the parliamentary track, the current state of Russian-Abkhaz relations, our interaction in the international arena, especially in the context of the situation around Ukraine, were discussed in detail. A cooperation agreement has been signed between the State Duma and the People’s Assembly.
By the end of the year, bilateral contacts are also possible with the recently elected Chairman of the Parliament of South Ossetia, A.Y. Alborov. The exchange of official visits at the level of the leadership of parliaments is being worked out. The agenda promises to be full, we have something to discuss with our South Ossetian friends.
I would also like to note that the Intergovernmental Commissions on Socio-Economic Cooperation are the most important platforms for solving applied issues of relations between Russia and the young Transcaucasian republics. Thus, on November 21 this year, an investment program to promote the socio-economic development of Abkhazia was approved for the next three-year period, which determines the parameters and directions of large-scale financial assistance provided by our country to the allies. On December 6, the 19th meeting of the Russian-Abkhaz IPC was held under the co-chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation A.V. Novak and Prime Minister of Abkhazia A.Z.Ankvab. The results of joint work on a number of key topics of mutual interest were discussed, as well as the implementation of the Program for the Formation of a common social and Economic Space between Russia and Abkhazia based on the harmonization of the legislation of the two countries and the State Program “Socio–economic Development of the Republic of Abkhazia for 2022-2025”, developed with the participation of the Russian side.
A similar event with South Ossetian colleagues is planned for early 2023.
Question: How are relations between Moscow and Tbilisi developing in the current geopolitical conditions? What are the prospects for resuming direct flights and visa liberalization for Georgian citizens?
Answer: Despite the difficult geopolitical conditions and the lack of diplomatic relations, Russian-Georgian relations do not stand still. An important element of the bilateral dialogue remains the contacts of the Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of the Federation Council, G.B.Karasin, with the Special Representative of the Prime Minister of Georgia for Relations with Russia, Z.Abashidze, in which practical aspects are discussed with an emphasis on trade, economic, transport and humanitarian spheres.
This concerns, in particular, the smooth functioning of the only functioning highway between our countries. On the Georgian side, the modernization of the road infrastructure is underway, including the construction of a tunnel under the Krestovy Pass, on our side, the Upper Lars checkpoint is being expanded. The relevant services coordinate their actions in order to prevent a decrease in the capacity of this transport artery.
We see that, despite provocative calls from outside, the Georgian government adheres to a pragmatic line. This has a positive effect. Trade and economic statistics speak for themselves. Over the 10 months of 2022, Georgia’s trade turnover with Russia increased by 51% compared to the same period in 2021 and approached a record $2 billion. For 11 months of this year, almost 1 million Russian citizens have visited Georgia. Money transfers from Russia to Georgia have increased by 3.5 times – up to $1.4 billion this year.
Largely due to Georgia’s impressive revenues from inbound tourism, remittances and trade with Russia, Georgia’s economic growth forecast has been raised to double digits this year.
As for the prospects of resuming direct flights and visa liberalization for Georgian citizens, if the necessary prerequisites are formed for this (the conditions in Tbilisi are well known), we do not rule out making decisions in this regard.
Question: How would you comment on cooperation on biosafety issues with Armenia and Azerbaijan? Are there any working contacts with the Georgian side on the activities of the Lugar Center?
Answer: Against the background of the exposure of the military-biological activity of the United States and its satellites in Ukraine, we pay increased attention to cooperation on this issue with the countries of the post-Soviet space, including the states of Transcaucasia. It is important for us to make sure that biological research conducted in the immediate vicinity of our borders, especially conducted jointly with the United States and other NATO countries, does not pose a threat to Russia’s security.
The Armenian side constructively perceives the initiatives promoted by Russia to form a legal framework for cooperation on biosafety on a bilateral basis and within the framework of the CSTO and the CIS. On May 6, 2021, during Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Armenia, a bilateral Intergovernmental memorandum of understanding on biosafety was signed. In accordance with its provisions, useful interdepartmental consultations on biological safety took place in March this year. Russian developments in the field of biomedical safety were demonstrated to Armenian partners. We see that Yerevan is ready to increase cooperation with Russian colleagues, including studying the experience of legislative regulation, improving infrastructure, training and advanced training of personnel, joint production of vaccines and medical equipment.
We look forward to more active cooperation in this sensitive area with our Azerbaijani partners. This is fully in line with the Declaration on Allied Cooperation signed by our leaders, which states that the parties will explore the possibilities of establishing cooperation in the field of biological safety. Such a dialogue meets the interests of both Moscow and Baku.
As for Georgia, we are still waiting for a response from official Tbilisi to our request for Russian experts to visit the R. Lugar National Health Center operating in the suburbs of Tbilisi on the basis of agreed parameters in order to make sure that no closed military biological research is conducted at its base.
Question: After a pause of many months, the next round of International Geneva Discussions on security and stability in Transcaucasia took place in October. When can a new meeting be held? What are the reasons for the downtime of this important negotiation format? Does it remain in demand? What hopes does the Russian side pin on the continuation of its work?
Answer: Indeed, after a nine-month break, the next round of International Geneva Discussions on security and stability in Transcaucasia took place on October 5. We agreed to hold it in Geneva and our participation in it after receiving guarantees from the host Swiss side of Bern’s non-discriminatory attitude towards members of the Russian delegation, taking into account the Confederation’s accession to the well-known anti-Russian sanctions and restrictive measures imposed by the European Union.
Unfortunately, contrary to the assurances of the Co-Chairs from the UN, OSCE and the European Union, they could not ensure the restoration of the previous working rhythm of the Geneva format. Instead of announcing the date of the next – December – round, the “troika” of international experts decided to put the Discussions on pause again, this time – until February 2023. Moreover, both at the beginning of this year and now, the co-chairs made these decisions behind the scenes, without consulting with all participants. And this despite the fact that most of the national delegations, including the Russian one, were ready to gather for regular meetings, including at the end of this year, as the organizers were well aware. As a result, only one round took place in 2022 instead of the usual four.
Despite the lack of clear explanations, we clearly see the true background of what is happening: our colleagues from Washington and Brussels were tempted to bring geopolitics to the Transcaucasian direction.
For our part, we proceed from the fact that the relevance of the Geneva discussions in the changing geopolitical situation is only increasing. The imperative of regular contacts between the official representatives of Tbilisi, Sukhum and Tskhinval becomes obvious against the background of provocative calls from Kiev and some Western capitals to the Georgian authorities to open a “second front” against Russia in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In these circumstances, the issues promoted by Moscow and its Abkhaz and South Ossetian allies on the elaboration of a legally binding agreement on the non-use of force by Georgia against Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the delimitation of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian state borders and their subsequent demarcation, are becoming a priority.
