Question: Ukraine plans to increase tariffs for the transit of Russian oil through the Druzhba pipeline from January 1, 2023. Does Russia agree with these conditions? Is there a risk that Ukraine may suspend oil pumping if Moscow does not support tariff increases? Are we developing a plan “B” in case of suspension of oil transit through Ukrainian territory?
Answer: This issue lies exclusively in the commercial plane. It should have been addressed to PJSC “Transneft”, as well as to our colleagues from the Ministry of Energy of Russia.
As far as we know, in November, Transneft confirmed receipt of a notification from Ukrtransnafta about an increase in tariffs for pumping oil through the Druzhba pipeline running through the territory of Ukraine from January 1, 2023.
I can only add that on December 20 this year, in an interview with the Rossiya 24 TV channel, the president of Transneft, N.P. Tokarev, said that next year the volume of oil pumping through the southern branch of the Druzhba oil pipeline to Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic will remain at the level of this year.
Question: Do Russia and Belarus plan to increase the size of the joint regional grouping of the Union State, taking into account the aggravation of the situation on its western borders? Is it planned to use this group during the SVO in Ukraine? In general, how do Moscow and Minsk plan to strengthen the border of the Union State with Ukraine in order to exclude provocations and prevent the military conflict from “spilling over” into the territory of Belarus?
Answer: Against the background of the emerging military-political situation in the region ‑ the ongoing pumping of Western weapons into Ukraine, the buildup of NATO forces in Poland and the Baltic States – additional contingents of the Regional Grouping of Troops (forces) have been deployed since October on the territory of Belarus, events of combat coordination of formations and military units, regular joint exercises and maneuvers are held. All these actions are transparent, exclusively defensive in nature, designed to provide additional security to the western borders of the Union State.
For the same purposes, our countries closely cooperate in the military-technical sphere, carry out mutual supplies of weapons and components for the production of military equipment. In particular, the Armed Forces of Belarus received the latest samples of Russian weapons ‑ S-400 air defense systems and Iskander mobile tactical missile launchers. This should increase the combat capability of the Belarusian army and the effectiveness of the unified Russian-Belarusian air defense system.
During the working visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Minsk on December 19, a decision was announced to provide training for the crews of combat aircraft converted for the possible use of ammunition with a special warhead. Similar events have been held by the United States with its NATO allies for decades. In this case, we are also talking about the symmetrical response of Russia and Belarus to the unfriendly steps of the alliance countries.
The task of the joint Russian-Belarusian grouping of troops is, if necessary, to repel a potential enemy in the event of an invasion of the territory of our ally Belarus. At the same time, raising the question about the possibility of using this group during the SVO in Ukraine is incorrect. The current Military Doctrine of the Union State assumes that the use of military force directed against any participating State is considered as an encroachment on the Union State as a whole. The adoption of appropriate retaliatory measures in this case remains at the discretion of the political and military leadership of Russia and Belarus.
Moscow and Minsk are actively cooperating on the protection of the western borders of the Union State, including the modernization of border infrastructure. The border services of our countries exchange information on entry and exit issues in real time, conduct joint “stop lists” with respect to foreigners whose presence is considered undesirable on the territories of our states. Other steps are being taken to strengthen the common migration space of Russia and Belarus within the framework approved in November 2021. The concept of the Migration Policy of the Union State and the recently approved Action Plan for its implementation.
Question: How are the current drafts of the peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan proposed to solve the problem of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh? Do you think it is likely that Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the mediation of Russia, will be able to sign a peace treaty, “putting out of brackets” the definition of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh? Do all parties agree with this approach?
Answer: I would like to emphasize that the peace treaty is being discussed directly between Baku and Yerevan. Moscow only provides assistance to the parties, as it is recorded in the trilateral statement of the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia following the Sochi summit on October 31, 2022. Negotiations on such a sensitive topic are strictly confidential. We have no right to comment on their content, including on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. It will only hurt the case.
We believe that the implementation of all the trilateral agreements at the highest level of November 9, 2020, January 11 and November 26, 2021 and October 31, 2022, which formed the roadmap for the comprehensive normalization of Azerbaijani-Armenian relations, will contribute to achieving progress in the work on the peace treaty. In particular, we hope for gradual progress in such areas as unblocking transport and economic ties in the region, delineating the border, and solving humanitarian problems.
Question: How does Moscow assess Chisinau’s decision to temporarily abandon gas supplies from Russia to the right bank of the Dniester, redirecting the volumes received to Transnistria? Can this be considered a “reasonable compromise”, as it is called in Moldova?
Answer: We are closely following the development of relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol. The parties really managed to reach an agreement on the “gas in exchange for electricity” scheme. Chisinau has resumed the supply of Russian gas to Transnistria in full, and Tiraspol has resumed the supply of electricity from the Moldovan GRES at an affordable price, which is significantly lower than the cost of electricity from other sources. In fact, the gas supplied from Moldova goes to the Transnistrian power plant to generate cheap energy for both banks of the Dniester.
As far as we understand, it was a mutually beneficial arrangement. If the implementation of this algorithm suits both sides, then we can only welcome it. We hope that this will help to bring their positions closer on other issues.
Question: Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of Moldova N.N. Popescu said that his country is in a very difficult security situation, and it needs to strengthen its defense capabilities. Chisinau expects, in particular, to intensify military cooperation with Germany, Romania, and France. Does Moscow consider such statements by the Moldovan authorities a threat to its security, and what will be our reaction?
Answer: The intensification of Chisinau’s cooperation with NATO countries in the military and military-technical spheres is a factor that undermines the security of Moldova itself to a greater extent. As experience shows, the reckless pumping of a country with Western weapons or the deployment of NATO contingents on its territory does not add to its security and sovereignty, but, on the contrary, brings it closer to disaster. The sad experience of Ukraine from the Moldavian land, I believe, is very clearly visible.
We have repeatedly called on official Chisinau to consciously approach the proposals imposed by Westerners to “increase the defense capability” of Moldova, which have nothing to do with the task of maintaining peace and stability. Despite this, the current Moldovan authorities are demonstrating a disposition to develop closer cooperation with Western countries in the military sphere. For this purpose, in particular, NATO instruments and mechanisms of the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU are used. It is obvious that such steps, along with Chisinau’s unconditional support for the Kiev regime, undermine Moldova’s neutral status enshrined in the constitution.
I would like to once again express doubt that such “assistance” from the West, more like “development of the territory”, is carried out in the interests of Moldova itself.
