Dear Mr. Chairman,
Dear colleagues,
I am pleased to address the Conference on Disarmament. I was hoping that I could do it live while in Geneva. However, this turned out to be impossible due to the refusal of the European Union to respect one of the fundamental human rights – the right to freedom of movement. Having chosen the path of unilateral illegitimate sanctions, the EU countries are trying to get away from an honest face-to-face dialogue, from direct contacts designed to help find political solutions to acute international problems.
The hottest of them – the tragedy of Ukraine – is the result of the connivance of Western patrons to the criminal regime that was formed there after the bloody unconstitutional coup in February 2014, carried out contrary to the guarantees of Germany, Poland and France under the agreement on the settlement of the internal Ukrainian crisis. Even then, the attitude of the putschists to European values became clear. Today, the dangers that the Zelensky regime poses to neighboring countries and international security in general have increased significantly after the authorities who settled in Kiev started dangerous games related to plans to acquire their own nuclear weapons.
The irresponsible statements made in this regard are not empty bravado. Ukraine still has Soviet nuclear technologies and means of delivering such weapons. We cannot but react to this real danger. I can assure you that Russia, as a responsible member of the international community, committed to its obligations on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, is taking all necessary measures to prevent the emergence of nuclear weapons and related technologies in Ukraine. We hope that everyone is aware of the need to solve this problem.
Today, there is a demand for intensive joint work in order to increase predictability and prevent new rounds of the arms race. In the current conditions, it is necessary to abandon any actions aimed at dismantling the architecture of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament (CWRN). It is extremely important to refrain from dangerous steps in the field of military construction, which could be perceived as a violation of the principle of equal and indivisible security.
Unfortunately, it is this fundamental principle that NATO member countries refuse to comply with, doubling their efforts to contain Russia. It is enough to mention the involvement of the Kiev regime in the orbit of the alliance, the supply of lethal weapons to it, as well as the conduct of provocative military exercises and other events near the Russian borders.
Our Western colleagues have not yet demonstrated their readiness to provide Russia with legally binding, long-term security guarantees. We are talking about the rejection of further expansion of NATO, including the withdrawal of the “Bucharest formula” that Ukraine and Georgia will become members of the alliance. Western countries need to abandon the creation of military facilities on the territory of states that were previously part of the USSR and are not members of the alliance, including the use of their infrastructure for conducting any military activity. It is necessary to return NATO’s military capabilities, including strike capabilities, and infrastructure to the state of 1997, when the Russia-NATO Founding Act was concluded. For us, achieving these goals is of fundamental importance.
I once again call on the United States, its allies and clients to strictly fulfill their international obligations to strengthen their own security at the expense of others. It is obvious that this would contribute to improving the military-political situation in the Euro-Atlantic, creating prerequisites for advancing the entire range of issues in the field of arms control, including possible work on new agreements.
The UN disarmament mechanism plays a decisive role in finding ways to bring the KVRN system out of the crisis. Its key element is the Conference on Disarmament. The results of its activities directly affect the security of all mankind.
On the agenda of the Conference, we highlight the issue of developing a multilateral legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. It is intended to strengthen the international legal regime in the field of space security. As you know, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty contains a ban on the deployment of any types of WMD there. It is clear that this rule does not apply to other types of weapons. Taking advantage of this, some countries have begun to “weaponize” the exploration of outer space. Doctrinal documents have been adopted, plans for putting weapons systems into orbit, including shock ones, are being made up and put into the implementation stage. The threat of a new arms race and the transformation of outer space into an arena of armed conflict is gaining real features. All this is fraught with grave consequences for global stability.
Russia and China submitted to the Conference a draft treaty on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space, the use of force or the threat of force against space objects. We consider it unacceptable to delay the launch of such negotiations. Attempts to replace a legally binding instrument in this area with some half-measures in the form of “rules of responsible behavior” in space are considered counterproductive.
We are convinced that negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space will create a favorable background for moving towards nuclear disarmament – another agenda item to which Russia pays the closest attention.
On our initiative, in February 2021, the Russian-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms was extended for five years without any conditions. By agreement of the Presidents of Russia and the United States, a comprehensive dialogue on strategic stability has been initiated. Its key task is to lay the foundations for future arms control and risk reduction measures. We are ready to work together on a new “security equation” that takes into account all the factors of strategic stability in their interrelation.
It is unacceptable for us that, contrary to the fundamental provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, there are still US nuclear weapons on the territory of a number of European countries. The vicious practice of “joint nuclear missions” involving non-nuclear NATO countries persists. Within their framework, scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons in Russia are being worked out. It is high time to bring American nuclear weapons home, and to completely eliminate the infrastructure associated with them in Europe.
We have always assumed and proceed from the fact that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it should never be unleashed. This principle is confirmed in the joint statement of the Presidents of Russia and the United States of June 16, 2021 and in the joint statement of the heads of state of Russia and China of June 28, 2021. It is important that on the initiative and with the most active participation of Russia, a joint statement of the leaders of the five nuclear powers on the prevention of nuclear war and the prevention of an arms race was developed and adopted on January 3 this year.
In order to ensure predictability and restraint in the missile sphere in the conditions of the termination of the INF Treaty, our country unilaterally undertook not to be the first to deploy systems subject to the Treaty in those regions where similar American-made facilities will not be deployed. We call on the United States and its allies to follow our example. I would like to emphasize that Russia has not had and does not have medium- and shorter-range ground-based missiles. To say the opposite means creating a deliberately false picture and covering up the actions of those who bear the real blame for the scrapping of the INF Treaty.
Russia remains open to initiatives on multilateral negotiating formats on the prevention of an arms race and strengthening strategic stability. We believe that such ideas should be implemented on the basis of consensus, taking into account the legitimate interests and concerns of all potential participants.
We hope that this year the 10th NPT Review Conference, which has been repeatedly postponed, will be held – one of the key elements of the system of international security and strategic stability. It is necessary that the Conference be held in a constructive business atmosphere and, following its results, the participating States confirm their readiness to strictly follow the commitments they have undertaken. Russia is open to cooperation with all countries in the interests of the successful holding of the forum.
We have questions about the controversial idea of Australia, the UK and the USA to create a closed partnership AUKUS. It is obvious that AUKUS negatively affects the nuclear nonproliferation regime, provokes tension and forms prerequisites for the beginning of a new round of the arms race, and not only in the Asia-Pacific region.
We hope for progress with the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). In this regard, the US position is disappointing. The current US administration has been working for more than a year, but Washington’s previous approach, set out in the 2018 nuclear doctrine, which recorded the refusal to ratify the CTBT, has not yet been revised.
Efforts are continuing to restore the full implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to Resolve the situation around the Iranian nuclear program. We hope that they will be crowned with success. There is no reasonable alternative to the JCPOA. The obligations under the “nuclear deal”, backed up by UN Security Council resolution 2231, must be strictly fulfilled by everyone without any reservations. We are forced to state that the current situation is a clear evidence of how costly Washington’s non-negotiability is to global security. A policy based on pressure and blackmail is hopeless.
There is a demand for support for efforts to establish a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Middle East, as stipulated by the resolution of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. On the positive side – the convening of two sessions of the Conference in accordance with the decision taken in December 2018 by the UN General Assembly. Russia actively participated in the work of these forums as an observer. We expect Israel to join this process, as well as the United States, a co-sponsor of the resolution on the 1995 CCZ.
We advocate strengthening the regime of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). We are committed to constructive work in order to effectively conduct the BTWC Review Conference. We call on our partners to support Russian initiatives aimed at strengthening the institutional foundations of the Convention.
The situation in the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) continues to cause deep concern. This is a direct result of the destructive line of the United States and its allies in line with the flawed and harmful concept of a “rules-based world order” promoted by them. Western countries have actually “privatized” this technical international structure and subordinated it to their geopolitical ambitions. The secretariat of the Organization is openly used by them for political pressure on “undesirable” governments, against which unsubstantiated accusations are being made. It is in the interests of the world community to do everything possible so that the OPCW does not become an instrument for individual States to achieve unseemly narrow-minded goals.
Dear colleagues,
We proceed from the fact that the Conference is able to reverse the destructive trends in the field of KVRN, to make a significant contribution to strengthening international security and stability. The Russian initiative to develop an international convention for the suppression of acts of chemical and biological terrorism is also aimed at solving this problem. Strengthening the international legal framework for countering WMD terrorism meets the interests of all States.
If there is political will, the Conference participants can and should overcome their differences and reach mutually acceptable solutions that open the way to the resumption of negotiation work. There are chances for this. We expect that the “six” Chairmen of the 2022 session of the Conference will make their contribution.
Thank you for your attention. I wish you success!
