Thursday, March 28

Interview with S. Vershinin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 16 November 2022 IEC Izvestia

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Question: By the evening of November 18, the deadline for the grain deal expires. Six days before this date, you acknowledged that Moscow has not yet decided whether or not it will agree to extend the agreement on the export of grain from the Black Sea ports, because Russia’s requirements under this deal have still not been met: restrictions on the export of food and fertilizers from the Russian Federation have not been lifted. Who exactly is stalling this and is progress possible in the days remaining before the end of the deal?

Answer: First of all, I would like to clarify, because the details are important here. Many people forget that the agreements that were reached in Istanbul on July 22 are comprehensive or, as we say, package deals. They consist of two parts, two separate agreements, which, meanwhile, constitute an overall deal.

One is the Black Sea initiative and the export of grain and fertilizers from Ukraine. The other is a memorandum that Russia and the U.N. Secretariat signed to help unhindered access to world markets for agricultural products and fertilizers from Russia. These agreements are interconnected, they are part of one package, as UN Secretary General Guterres said in his time, including during his meeting in Moscow with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

If the agreements on Ukraine – the so-called Black Sea grain deal – were signed for 120 days, the second part was signed for three years. That is, now when they talk about the extension, first of all, the first part of this package is meant. And the possibility of extending this agreement on the grain deal after it expires for another 120 days is essentially a technical thing, if one of the parties has no objections. That is why there is no need for any special additional approvals.

But it is very important for us that one part of the deal does not work without there being some real changes in the other track, which concerns our agricultural products and our fertilizers. And we don’t see those real changes, despite our efforts.

So when we think about extensions, we take into account a number of factors. We have our own considerations. And they concern just the second part of the package on the topic of our agricultural products. We are having very active consultations with representatives of the UN Secretariat and, in particular, with the Secretary General of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) R. Greenspan. We held these consultations in Moscow, Geneva, New York. We held these consultations in Moscow, Geneva, and New York, and everywhere we conducted them in terms of the effectiveness of the efforts that our United Nations partners tell us they are making.

But these efforts must be tangible not just in words, but in our economy and those who work in agriculture, shipping, guarantees and the financial sector. After all, exporting our food and fertilizers is not just about sending somewhere, like wheat. This means that transactions must be made, transportation must be available, and calling at European ports, from where further distribution of products is coming, was possible both for Russian ships and for ships that carry Russian cargo. And this is what the various explanations from both Washington and Brussels say when they say that all so many sanctions against Russia provide for exceptions for food and fertilizer exports.

But it is important that this is not just in words. We are checking it all out in practice. And, unfortunately, we still cannot say that the results are real. There is some progress, but it does not correspond to what it is supposed to be, since there has been so much talk about global food security.

Question: The second point to which Moscow has repeatedly drawn attention. If we take mid-October UN data, it turns out that since August 1, when grain shipments from Ukraine began, the vast majority of cargoes went to the EU and Turkey, while the poorest countries, which suffer most from hunger, like Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan and Djibouti, received only crumbs on the leftover principle. Does Russia have any mechanisms to control the receipt of grain by end users?

Answer: As of today, more than 10 million tons of grain, most of which is not wheat, but corn, have been exported from Ukrainian ports. Of this volume, 51% of ships go to developed countries and only 3% – to those countries, which the UN calls the poorest. We do have serious questions: everything was started under slogans of fighting hunger and ensuring food security. And now it turns out that under this mimicry agricultural products go to the wrong countries, about which the West spoke with such enthusiasm at one time in order to come to the Istanbul agreements.

We naturally ask these questions, especially since this was all on a wave of very serious accusations and pressure on Russia. We showed that we could work constructively by launching this agreement. But then everyone saw that food products did not go the way they were originally supposed to. To the arguments that sometimes some raw material, let’s say corn or wheat, goes first for processing, we say that we have to know the end consumer in order to understand what all this considerable effort is for. We have asked these questions and are asking them to the UN, but so far we have not received any answers.

Question: So there is no control mechanism, only talk?

Answer: Yes, and their references to the fact that all these things are commercial in nature.

Question: After the drone attack on the ships of the Black Sea Fleet at the end of October, Moscow renewed its participation in the grain deal, saying that the Russian side was given sufficient guarantees that the humanitarian corridor would only be used for its intended purpose. How ironclad do these guarantees look?

Answer: I would not talk about any “ironclad” guarantees, precisely because their firmness and feasibility depends not on what is written on paper, but on what partner you are dealing with. And here, unfortunately, we have questions. After all, essentially all the conditions, including the non-military use of the humanitarian corridor, were written down before, but violated as soon as such terrible things as the terrorist attack on the Crimean bridge and the attack in Sevastopol on the ships that were providing the maintenance of the humanitarian corridor took place. This, too, is a very serious cause for reflection. We have taken note of the assurances we have received from the Ukrainian side, but at the same time we reserve the right to respond firmly and decisively to any possible provocations of this kind.

Q.: Another problematic issue in the Istanbul arrangements was the financial issue, or, more precisely, the lack of access to the SWIFT system for Russia. As I understand, you have repeatedly discussed with the UN the need to connect Rosselkhozbank to SWIFT. Are there any progress on this issue?

Answer: We consider this issue to be of major importance, because, whatever deliveries are planned, nothing can happen without the possibility of carrying out transactions. Without payment for supplied agricultural products and fertilizers supplies simply cannot take place.

As part of the broad sanctions against Russia, our banks are cut off from the SWIFT system. We are trying to make sure that Rosselkhozbank, which is the main Russian bank for financing such transactions, is reconnected to SWIFT. But it is not there yet. We are trying to find some interim solutions – to open correspondent accounts in Rosselkhozbank for those consumers, who receive our grain. But there are hundreds if not thousands of such consumers. And this process cannot be done manually. We need to reconnect to SWIFT.

And we were quite clear about our conditions: when we connect to SWIFT, Rosselkhozbank will only deal with transactions related to food and fertilizers and will give the necessary guarantees that this will be the case.

And that brings us back to the broader question. We have sanctions imposed by Brussels and Washington against Russia, and at the same time there are clarifications that food and fertilizer exports are not part of these sanctions. It is necessary for such explanations to be binding.

Plus, there is also such a concept – what we call the English word “overcompliance”, that is, reinsurance and even fear of companies to incur damages and fines if they do something wrong. And they often don’t know how to do it. This issue is also very important. We have not solved it yet, but we believe it should be done as soon as possible.

Q: Regarding Russian fertilizers. Back in the summer a number of European countries arrested Russian ships with mineral fertilizers because of the sanctions – about 280 thousand tons in total. Last week there appeared some light at the end of the tunnel – on November 11 the Netherlands allowed 20 thousand tons of Russian fertilizers stuck in Rotterdam to be sent to Malawi. A day later, D. Konyaev, head of Uralkali, said that an agreement had been reached to export the fertilizers blocked in Belgium and Estonia to Africa. Is it possible to assume that at least the issue of Russian fertilizer exports has been resolved? Or there could still be a catch?

Answer: I’ll say it again, we need to understand the details very well here. We are not talking about Russian fertilizers in general, but about those that were arrested in European ports in a number of countries because their producers – our companies – were on the sanctions list. The Russian side decided that we would donate these fertilizers to countries in need, primarily on the African continent. That is, this is not a commercial operation. Dragging this issue out for months was incomprehensible to us and condemned by us. If someone was talking about food security, about the need to fight hunger, they had to make decisions instantly so that these fertilizers would go to their destination.

Now, as you said, there is “light at the end of the tunnel,” and the first ship will leave from the Netherlands – again, at no cost to the consumer. This is done with the assistance of the UN World Food Program, which takes care of fertilizer distribution, but does not forget to take extra money from us for its services, by the way.

But it concerns only 280 thousand tons. And I want to stress that up to 80% of these 280 thousand tons remain in Latvia. And Latvia still has not given any permits to start the shipment process. This is why we urge the United Nations partners and, through them, European partners, to do this noble deed, all the more so because we are talking about a gratuitous operation for Africans.

So, we cannot say yet that our fertilizers have “gone. So far, we only try to take these specific 280 thousand tons to Africans for free. And to ensure next year’s crop, it is absolutely essential to solve the problem with fertilizers in general as soon as possible. And I would like to emphasize – if this purely humanitarian issue involves politics, a desire to punish someone, it is absolutely unfair and wrong game. But, unfortunately, this is exactly what is happening so far.

Question: If we take into account all of Russia’s considerations that you just listed, and the fact that we are not yet being met, what are the chances that Moscow will voice its objections to extending the
to the extension of the grain deal?

Answer: We are people for whom the humanitarian dimension of the issue is not an empty phrase. We understand what food, fertilizers mean to the world market, and we know that supplies from Russia far exceed the potential of any other country, including Ukraine. We say that this year we will export 30 million tons of grain, next year – 50 million tons. Our fertilizers, too, amount to 20 million tons. And we would not like to fail in our efforts to ensure global food security. But this is just about putting into practice the statements that have been made by Western representatives about exemptions from sanctions for food categories of products. If that is done, things can continue on normal terms. But it is a dangerous distortion for political reasons when one part of the package works and the other part does not produce concrete results.

Question: The other day, President Erdogan spoke out against a timetable for a grain deal. What does Moscow think about this? It is hardly beneficial for Russia to conclude an open-ended deal, when our partners do not always implement it in good faith, is it not?

Answer: We appreciate Turkey’s efforts. We have already spoken about that publicly. As for the timing of the deals reached in Istanbul, it seems to us that we should build on the document that was agreed then. And in this sense, it seems to me that the implementation period of 120 days for the Black Sea grain deal and three years for our memorandum is still justified.

Source: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1838911/

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