Dear Mr. Chairman,
At the beginning, I would like to emphasize again what I already said at the opening session of the IAEA Board of Governors on March 7: Russia believes that the idea of the IAEA Director General R.The idea of holding a trilateral (Russia-Ukraine-IAEA) meeting to develop a mechanism for ensuring operational and physical security for nuclear facilities in Ukraine may be useful. Such a meeting could be organized in the format of a videoconference or in a third country. We are ready for this. This is confirmed at the level of the President of the Russian Federation. We hope that the Ukrainian side, which, apparently, is still hesitating on this issue, will also demonstrate a constructive approach.
Dear Mr. Chairman,
Ensuring nuclear safety and nuclear safety of nuclear facilities is an absolute priority of Russia. The whole course of the special military operation demonstrates this, despite the anti-Russian campaign launched by the West. The mechanics of such campaigns have been known for a long time and are quite simple. First, false statements are thrown in. With their help, emotions are pumped up and panic is unwound. On this wave, rash statements are made by officials and hasty decisions are made. Subsequently, when a clarification or refutation of the initial information is published, it does not change anything, since the words have already been spoken publicly, and decisions have been made.
The most striking example of this kind is the events near the Zaporozhye NPP (ZAES) on the night of March 3 to 4 this year. We have already discussed this in detail at this session of the Council, so I will briefly repeat only the main points.
On the night of March 3 to 4, numerous reports appeared in the world media and on the Agency’s websites that Russian servicemen allegedly fired at the reactors of the Zaporozhye NPP. Then there were reports that a fire broke out on the territory of the NPP, threatening the whole world with a nuclear catastrophe. However, the very next morning it turned out that there was no shelling of nuclear installations, there was no damage to their buildings. Russian units guarding the perimeter of the station were attacked by Ukrainian saboteurs and had to drive them away with return fire. Leaving, the saboteurs set fire to the training building located outside the NPP, which was promptly extinguished by local firefighters. Five days have passed since then. All the facilities of the NPP are under the control of the Russian military. The staff of the station continues to work in normal mode: it has launched another reactor, maintains the facilities of the station, monitors the radiation situation. The background in the area of the NPP is normal. Staff rotation is provided. This is confirmed by the reports of the Ukrainian regulator and the Director General of the IAEA.
Dear Mr. Chairman,
Let’s look at what happens on other installations. Let’s start with the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. At the end of February, the world media were literally full of reports of radioactive contamination, which allegedly would cover the whole of Europe due to the fact that Russian troops entered Chernobyl. However, in practice, the radiation situation at the station is within normal limits. The safe functioning of its facilities is ensured. When it turned out that there was nothing to find fault with, a new accusation began to unfold. They say there has been no rotation of personnel at the nuclear power plant controlled by the Russian Armed Forces for almost two weeks. Expressions of concern in this regard have appeared several times even on the IAEA’s open website and social networks. We had to react to this and publicly emphasize: Russian troops do not create obstacles to the rotation of personnel of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, but the practical provision of such rotation is the task of Ukraine.
Another element of this campaign is the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology. At first, the media shouted that a research reactor had been destroyed there. Then it turned out that we are talking about a subcritical assembly. Then it turned out that it was not the assembly that was affected, but the building where it is located. As a result, it turns out that the assembly has been transferred to a safe state, the radiation background is normal, and in general, this assembly has not yet been put into operation.
Let me remind you that a week ago there was a big alarmism about the waste storage sites of the Radon enterprise in Kiev and Kharkiv. The excitement was such that even the Director General of the IAEA had to make an explanation that mainly low-radioactive waste is placed there. As a result, when it turned out that these objects were not damaged, they were simply forgotten about. Nothing interesting: there is no damage, the radiation background is normal. I hope there are enough examples to demonstrate that we are all the object of a large-scale and multi-level propaganda campaign.
I once again urge all colleagues: carefully double-check alarmist messages, do not give in to emotions, do not give in to provocations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
