Reflections on the Future of Political Islam
Vasily Kuznetsov, Doctor of Political Science, Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Center for Arab and Islamic Studies at the Institute of Oriental Studies, and Full Member of the Russian International Affairs Council (Russia)
Nearly a century has passed since various forms of Islamism emerged as the main political alternative in the Middle East when the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928.
Over the course of that century, organizations representing this current of religious and political thought have undergone profound transformation. Their ideology has grown increasingly sophisticated, their political tactics more flexible, and their organizational forms more diverse. By the 2010s, the movement encompassed both respectable political parties integrated into the political systems of major regional states and jihadist terrorist groups rejected by the international community.
What is striking, however, is that despite their long history, broad popular support across many countries, and considerable political skill, these movements almost nowhere succeeded in taking power. One partial exception was Hamas’s control over Gaza, although even there it never achieved full dominance within the Palestinian political system.
The Arab Spring appeared to offer Islamist movements a historic opportunity for political resurgence. Yet in Egypt, the experiment ended with the complete defeat of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013, while in Tunisia, Ennahda Movement was first gradually marginalized and later crushed. In most countries across the region, moderate Islamist groups integrated into representative institutions were steadily pushed to the margins of political life.
At the same time, radical organizations such as Islamic State faced strong resistance from the international community and were defeated relatively quickly, though not before seriously discrediting the very idea of political Islam, especially in the eyes of many Muslims themselves.
As a result, by the early 2020s, it seemed that the Islamist rise in the region had passed and that an Islamic political alternative was unlikely to re-emerge in the foreseeable future.
At first glance, the situation today appears unchanged: there is hardly any clear surge in the popularity of Islamist organizations anywhere. Across North Africa, including countries once seen as strongholds of Islamism such as Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, they now occupy a more or less marginal position. Even the Islamist background of Turkey’s AKP is no longer commonly emphasized. In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood was banned in 2025. In Palestine and Lebanon, Hamas and Hezbollah have lost significant resources as a result of Israeli military actions.
And yet, the present moment has also produced a set of conditions that may open the way for a renewed Islamist resurgence.
The most important of these factors is the ongoing socio-economic, and, in part, political, crisis across many countries in the region. The pandemic and the subsequent wave of global disruptions, which produced severe economic pressures, have not resulted in the renewal of the social contract widely anticipated throughout the 2010s. Instead, they have led to a form of political stabilization without meaningful systemic change and without any substantial strengthening of public trust in state institutions. This is reflected in electoral patterns in countries such as Algeria and Tunisia, as well as in the ongoing and often cyclical political crises in Libya, Lebanon, and Iraq.
Closely related to this is a second factor: the absence of an appealing ideological offer from the secular establishment and the broader crisis of political parties. Left-wing parties, which have always enjoyed only limited support, have not recovered anywhere in the region from the collapse of the socialist system. Even the political upheavals of the 2010s failed to revive leftist ideas. Centrist, pro-government parties remain largely de facto de-ideologized.
The nationalist turn of recent years, which is clearly visible in official political discourse throughout the 2020s, can provide only a limited basis for consolidation. Without a persuasive vision of national development, however, it risks stagnation and turning into an endless reference to a great past without a clear vision of an equally great future. The main exceptions are the Arab monarchies of the Gulf, with their strategic Visions, as well as Egypt. Thus, Islamist movements emerge as one of the few remaining ideological alternatives to the existing political reality.
The third factor is the demonstration effect of the Taliban’s triumphant return to power in Afghanistan, the relative resilience of Iran’s confrontation with Israel and the United States, and Israel and its allies’ inability to deliver a decisive defeat to Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Ansar Allah. In all these cases, the mere survival of anti-Western actors will likely be interpreted by their potential supporters as a clear victory, regardless of the actual losses they may have suffered. At the same time, Israel’s increasingly assertive policies in recent years will once again be seen as evidence of its fundamentally hostile posture.
Finally, the list of Islamist victories may also include Ahmad al-Sharaa’s rise to power in Syria. Despite the pragmatism demonstrated by his government in 2025, the Islamist roots of the new authorities remain firmly in mind not only for external actors, but also for supporters of the new leader himself, many of whom are dissatisfied with what they see as excessive political flexibility.
Of course, none of this suggests an imminent return of Islamism in its form from a decade ago. For any meaningful comeback, Islamist movements would need to do substantial homework and address a series of fundamental questions. What vision of the future can they offer to societies as a whole, rather than only to their own supporters? How can they respond to economic challenges—an area that has consistently been a weak point in Islamist political programs? How can they reconcile religious ideas with nationalism in their ideological frameworks, given that these two elements have only proven effective when combined? And what tactics can they adopt in a context where governments in most countries are now better prepared to manage mass protest movements, while societies themselves are increasingly fatigued by prolonged turbulence?
The regional context has also changed fundamentally. In the past, Islamist movements across the region could count on relatively steady external support, but this is no longer the case. Some states now adopt a firm anti–Muslim Brotherhood position, including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, while others, such as Qatar, maintain a more flexible approach. The key difference today, however, is that even these more flexible actors are no longer prepared to invest in supporting Islamist movements abroad.
This situation could change under the influence of several factors.
First, the outcome of the ongoing confrontation with Iran and the subsequent evolution of the Islamic Republic’s regional policy will play a major role. Will Tehran return to supporting the Axis of Resistance, or will it be forced to focus on domestic political processes? How will it shape its relations with the official authorities in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon? How deep will the rift become in its relations with the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council?
Second, much will depend on how the situation evolves within the Gulf monarchies. Will the Gulf Cooperation Council move toward greater consolidation, or will divergence between the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia continue? How significant will the real costs of the current war be for these monarchies, and will they still be able to sustain their support for allied forces in other countries at the necessary level? And how will all this affect developments in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt?
Finally, third, what will be the fate of the current Syrian regime? Will it ultimately manage to consolidate its power, or will the opponents of Ahmad al-Sharaa and his more pragmatic supporters eventually decide to disrupt the status quo in order to establish a more radical political order in the country?
There are no answers to any of these questions yet. However, it is already clear that normalization in the region will depend, on the one hand, on intraregional cooperation in addressing economic challenges, and, on the other, on the ability of governments and civil society to develop an ideological offer that is more attractive than the one put forward by Islamist movements.
The material was provided by the press service of the Primakov Center.
Photographs by Victoria Zudina victoria-zudina.com
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