Question: At the end of 2022, a videoconference was held between President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and President of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping, during which the Russian President invited his Chinese counterpart to pay a state visit to our country. Are preparations for this visit already underway? Is there any understanding when it can take place? In this regard, at what stage is the study of the visit of the new Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang to Russia? Is the arrival of the Chinese Foreign Minister expected in the near future?
Answer: The bilateral dialogue at the highest level is the basis of the strengthening strategic bond between our countries. The nature of Russian-Chinese relations determines the high intensity of contacts between the heads of state. Before the pandemic, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping met on average five times a year both as part of an exchange of visits and “on the sidelines” of multilateral events. Last year, against the background of an unstable epidemic situation in connection with Covid-19, there were two face–to-face meetings – in February in Olympic Beijing and in September within the framework of the SCO summit in Samarkand. December 30, 2022 Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping held videoconference talks, during which they summed up the results of their joint work over the year, discussed plans to strengthen bilateral partnership, including the schedule of upcoming contacts. As soon as the relevant decisions are made by the parties, we will announce them officially.
Our foreign ministers are also actively developing cooperation in a rapidly changing international environment. On January 9, Sergey Lavrov had his first telephone conversation with Qin Gang, during which he congratulated him on his appointment and invited him to visit our country at a convenient time for the parties. The Chinese Minister gratefully accepted the invitation. Currently, the foreign ministries of the two countries are working on options for organizing the first personal contact.
There is a mutual intention to expand meetings at other levels as well. So, consultations with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Ma Zhaoxu, who recently visited Moscow, were very informative.
Question: According to Moscow’s forecasts, will Russia and China be able to fully transfer calculations for the purchase of oil and coal to yuan this year? How do Moscow assess Beijing’s plans to create an oil yuan? Is a record trade turnover between the two countries expected this year?
Answer: The share of national currencies in bilateral settlements with China has been steadily increasing in recent years. This process accelerated significantly last year. In the first half of 2022, almost half of our trade with China was carried out in rubles and yuan, in the second half of the year this method of payment continued to gain popularity, including among energy companies. Given the significant role that energy supplies play in Russian-Chinese practical relations, I have no doubt that the use of national currencies will continue to grow, which will increase the independence of bilateral settlements, and therefore strengthen national economic security.
We proceed from the fact that both suppliers and consumers of energy resources should have a variety of opportunities for trading, from which they could choose the most suitable and convenient, and not rest on the monopoly, for example, of the dollar. Rubles, yuan or currencies of other states that do not seek to create artificial obstacles to other countries can and have already been successfully used for payments for energy supplies.
In recent years, we have been going from record to record in trade and economic cooperation with China. For two years in a row, the bilateral trade turnover has increased by a third annually. According to preliminary data from the Federal Customs Service of Russia, in 2022 it amounted to 183.9 billion in terms of US dollars. China firmly holds the first place in the list of Russia’s main trading partners. In the coming year, we aim to take the $200 billion target ahead of schedule, which we originally planned to reach by 2024, and move forward at an accelerated pace.
Question: Does Moscow think that relations with Beijing have reached a qualitatively new level, which should be consolidated by an appropriate agreement instead of the Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation signed in 2001 and extended until 2026? Is work on a new document already underway?
Answer: According to the general assessment of the heads of Russia and China, the relations of comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between our countries have reached an unprecedented high level. They can be called a model of cooperation between major powers in the 21st century. Our relations are based on an extensive institutional and legal framework for cooperation.
In July 2001 Russia and China have signed a fundamental Agreement on good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation. This voluminous document, which sets long-term guidelines for bilateral partnership, was concluded for a period of 20 years. Over the past period, the Treaty has played a decisive role in the formation and development of political interaction, trade and economic cooperation and humanitarian ties between Russia and China.
The experience of progressive deepening of Russian-Chinese cooperation shows that the Agreement has successfully withstood the test of time. The key provisions of this international legal act formed the basis of hundreds of bilateral documents, influenced the development of the regulatory framework of relations between Russia and China with third countries, made a significant contribution to the design of the conceptual foundations of such authoritative associations as the SCO and BRICS.
We are convinced that the relevance of the Treaty remains, it allows us to respond quickly and flexibly to emerging challenges and threats, create new effective forms of interaction, and ensure the full development of our relations in the current geopolitical situation. At this stage, we see no reason to replace it. That is why in 2021, celebrating its anniversary, the heads of state unanimously supported the idea of its extension (for a 5-year period).
Question: Given the increased frequency of missile tests by the DPRK and the recent invasion of North Korean drones into the airspace of the Republic of Korea, as well as plans by Washington and Seoul to conduct large-scale ground exercises, do you think the risks of clashes between North and South Korea are increasing? According to Moscow’s assessment, is it possible to say that by their actions the United States and South Korea have crossed all the “red lines” previously designated by Pyongyang, and can North Korea move from threats to the use of tactical nuclear weapons in such a situation? What will Moscow’s reaction be if this scenario is implemented?
Answer: Any actions of the armed forces of one of the Korean States, which may be regarded by the other side as hostile and contrary to the provisions of the inter-Korean agreement in the military field of September 19, 2018, are fraught with retaliatory measures and, accordingly, escalation of tension. However, so far, despite the violent demonstrations, mutual accusations and – in the case of Seoul – the “study of the issue” of a possible withdrawal from this important agreement, both sides are in no hurry to cancel their commitments to build confidence. And they, in particular, provide for the minimization of military activity in the buffer zone and the functioning of direct communication lines between the military of the two states.
In this situation, I think it is inappropriate to escalate panic and even hypothetically talk about the use of force or, even more so, nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula. No one is interested in this.
Question: The DPRK announced preparations for the launch of a military satellite. Can this be considered as a step towards further escalation of the conflict in the region? Does Moscow believe that there is still a chance of resolving the situation on the Korean peninsula through diplomatic means, is Russia preparing any new initiatives in this regard?
Answer: The steps planned in the DPRK to strengthen the military potential are a forced reaction to the unprecedented build-up of sanctions and force pressure on Pyongyang by Washington and Seoul. The cynicism of the situation is that these attempts to force the DPRK to unilateral disarmament run counter to the inter-Korean and North Korean-American agreements of 2018, which, let me remind you, directly linked the process of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula with building mutual trust and providing Pyongyang with firm security guarantees.
We hope that – as has happened many times in the more than seventy–year history of the confrontation – the methods of force will fail, and the current trend towards aggravation will inevitably be replaced by the search for ways of de-escalation and mutually beneficial solutions in the field of security. The most reliable way to reach lasting agreements in this area remains a multilateral political and diplomatic process aimed at creating a peace system in Northeast Asia, within the framework of which the legitimate concerns of all interested parties will be taken into account and reliable security guarantees will be provided to each other. We are ready to continue making efforts to resume such a dialogue as soon as possible.
Question: Although Japan formally joined the countries that support the introduction of a ceiling on prices for Russian oil, in practice Tokyo asked to make an exception for oil produced under the Sakhalin-2 project. In this case, does Russia plan to continue supplying energy resources under Sakhalin-2 to Japan, or will it reorient oil and LNG from this project to other markets?
Answer: The Russian Foreign Ministry is closely monitoring the unfriendly line of the administration of F.Kishida in relation to our country. Depending on Tokyo’s next steps, we will recommend appropriate political and economic countermeasures to the Government of the Russian Federation. As for the implementation of specific projects in the energy sector, this issue is being resolved through relevant departments and organizations.
Answer: Indeed, Japan has recently dramatically stepped up the modernization of its military potential, is increasing dangerous activities near the Russian borders, including conducting large-scale exercises together with the United States and other countries, and testing new types of missile and conventional weapons.
In this regard, we have repeatedly expressed strong protests to the Japanese side through diplomatic channels. We will continue to closely monitor the development of Japanese military construction and, in the event of any potential threats to the security of our Far Eastern regions, we will immediately take retaliatory measures in accordance with Russia’s defense doctrine.
Question: How is the implementation of the project for the construction of the Soyuz Vostok gas pipeline through the territory of Mongolia progressing? Have the recent protests in this country affected the construction plans?
Answer: We attach great importance to the implementation of the initiative to build a transit gas pipeline from Russia to China through the territory of Mongolia. We proceed from the fact that this important project is mutually beneficial and meets the interests of the three states. Economic operators – Gazprom PJSC on the Russian side – continue to work on the project.
The Government of Mongolia provides comprehensive assistance to our specialists. The public rallies in December 2022, which were purely of an internal political nature, did not affect our interaction in any way.
Question: Earlier, the Indonesian side invited Russian investors to participate in the construction of the new capital of Indonesia, which will be moved from Jakarta to the island of Kalimantan. Is Russia ready to accept this offer? If so, has the practical study of Russian participation already begun and in what areas? Which of the Russian regions, besides Moscow, showed interest in the project?
Answer: The implementation of the project of transferring the capital of Indonesia from Jakarta to Kalimantan Island, which is still at the initial stage, is of considerable commercial interest. In the future, Russian companies and organizations of various profiles could take part in tenders to be announced by the Indonesian side. In particular, we can talk about the connection of domestic transport and information and communication contractors to the creation of an integrated infrastructure of Nusantara.
Question: Are preparations underway for the annual summit of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister N. Modi? When and where can it take place? Do Moscow expect that economic cooperation between the two countries will be brought to a new level this year? Does Russia plan to further increase the volume of oil supplies to India, and how fair are the reports of a number of Western publications that the Indian market is oversaturated with Russian oil and sometimes it is sold at a price below cost? When does Russia plan to complete the delivery of S-400 missile systems to India?
Answer: The leaders of our countries regularly discuss topical issues on the bilateral and international agenda. Such a “reconciliation of hours” is carried out in various formats and when it is dictated by the logic of a particularly privileged strategic partnership between Russia and India. The leaders do not need to artificially demonstrate the strength of Russian-Indian relations, which are based on solid historical and cultural roots, mutual respect and consideration of each other’s security interests.
Last year, bilateral trade and economic cooperation received a powerful impetus. The mutual trade turnover has reached the level of almost 30 billion US dollars. The sanctions imposed by the West on Moscow have become a catalyst for trade with India, accelerating the transition to settlements in national currencies and the joint development of self-sufficient transport and financial infrastructure. I am sure that the growth trend will continue this year.
We will continue to export to India as much oil as it needs to ensure its own energy security. Russian energy companies ensure the fulfillment of relevant applications as soon as possible.
India has not joined the “price ceiling” imposed by the West on oil from Russia. Therefore, the contract price for the shipment of our fuel to Indian companies is formed, as it should be in a civilized economic community, by market methods. In addition, Russia has repeatedly stated that it will not sell energy resources at a loss.
As for the supply of military products to India, this work is being carried out on schedule and will be completed within the time stipulated by the contractual obligations of the parties.
Source: Russian Foreign Ministry
