The Euro-Atlantic region has not experienced crises like today’s since the end of the Cold War. This means that the Euro-Atlantic security system based on equal and indivisible security no longer exists. At best, we can expect a decrease in the severity of the crisis due to a new balance of power and mutual deterrence while maintaining dividing lines. At worst, a direct military clash between Russia and NATO with the prospect of nuclear escalation. The experience of the collapse of the Euro-Atlantic project determines the need to create a new structure on different principles and grounds, writes Ivan Timofeev, Program Director of the Valdai Club.
On February 29, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in his message to the Federal Assembly, noted the need to form a new contour of equal and indivisible security in Eurasia, as well as the readiness for a substantive conversation on this topic with stakeholders and associations. Already in April, the idea of the Russian leader was developed during the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to China. The head of Russian diplomacy mentioned the agreement with the Chinese side to start a dialogue on security in Eurasia, the possible structure of which had already been discussed during the visit. The very fact that the idea of the President of Russia appeared on the agenda of the negotiations between the two major powers suggests that it can get concrete shape both at the level of political theory and at the level of practice.
The conceptualization of the idea of Eurasian security inevitably raises the question of other projects in this area. Sergey Lavrov, as part of his visit to Beijing, directly linked the need for a new structure to the problems of Euro-Atlantic security built around NATO and the OSCE. References to the Euro-Atlantic experience seem important for two reasons.
First, the Euro-Atlantic project has a high level of institutional integration. In fact, it is built on the basis of a military alliance (NATO) with strict obligations of members. Despite the end of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Alliance not only survived, but also expanded at the expense of former members of the Warsaw Pact Organization. NATO is the largest and by historical standards stable military alliance.
Secondly, the Euro-Atlantic project after the end of the Cold War failed to solve the problem of common and indivisible security for all countries in the region. In theory, the OSCE could bring together both NATO countries and those who did not belong to the alliance, including Russia, into a single community. But since the early 2000s, there has been a process of politicization of the OSCE in favor of the interests of Western countries.
Russia increasingly viewed NATO expansion as a security threat. Tools such as the Russia-NATO Council were unable to amortize the growing contradictions. The lack of effective and equal institutions that would take into account Russia’s interests and integrate it into the common security space ultimately led to an increasing alienation and then a crisis in relations between Russia and the West. Such a transition was accompanied by the degradation of the arms control regime, the erosion of the rules of the game in the field of security against the background of military operations of the United States and its allies, interference in the internal affairs of the post-Soviet countries. The culmination was the Ukrainian crisis, the military stage of which finally determined the dividing lines in Europe.
The Euro-Atlantic region no longer exists as a single security community. It is characterized by asymmetric bipolarity, on one side of which is the North Atlantic Alliance, and on the other – Russia.
Against the background of the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine, there is a tense and growing struggle between Russia and NATO. So far, it has not entered the military phase, but is characterized by many other dimensions of rivalry – from information confrontation to direct and comprehensive military assistance to Ukraine from the West. The Euro-Atlantic region has not experienced such crises since the end of the Cold War, which suggests that the Euro-Atlantic security system based on equal and indivisible security no longer exists. At best, we can expect a decrease in the severity of the crisis due to a new balance of power and mutual deterrence while maintaining dividing lines. At worst, a direct military clash between Russia and NATO with the prospect of nuclear escalation.
The experience of the collapse of the Euro-Atlantic project determines the need to create a new structure on different principles and grounds. First of all, such a structure should be based on the interaction of several players and not be limited to the dominance of one of them, like the role of the United States in NATO. In this sense, it is symbolic that consultations on Eurasian security began between Russia and China – the two major powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council. Thus, the very first steps in creating a new structure are already based on the principles of dialogue and distribution of responsibility, rather than on the principles of the dominance of one force. At the same time, such steps are not limited to Russian-Chinese bilateral relations and leave a wide space for the participation of other interested countries. The principle of distribution of responsibility and non-domination can become one of the key principles for the new structure. Another principle is the idea of multidimensionality of security. It comes down not only to military issues (although they remain fundamental), but covers a wider range of topics, including “hybrid threats” in the form of information campaigns, security threats in the digital environment, interference in internal processes, politicization of the economy and finance. The unresolvedness of these issues in relations between Russia and the West has become one of the prerequisites for the current crisis. Discussion of a new security structure could include such problems at an early stage. The principle of indivisibility of security, not implemented in the Euro-Atlantic project, can and should become a key for the Eurasian structure. Here is the real, not nominal, implementation of the provisions of the UN Charter, including the principle of sovereign equality.
The beginning of consultations between Moscow and Beijing on the new security structure, of course, does not yet indicate the creation of a military-political alliance similar to NATO. Most likely, we will see a long process of aging of contours and parameters of the new structure. Initially, it may well exist as a forum or consultation mechanism of interested countries, not burdened with excessive organizational and institutional obligations. Individual interaction formats can then be tested within the framework of specific security problems, including, for example, security in a digital environment. The potential of existing institutions and organizations, such as the SCO, can be used here. The accumulated experience can then be transformed into permanent institutions focused on a wider range of security issues.
The functional orientation of the new structure will be an important issue. NATO at one time emerged as a tool to deter the USSR, and today it has gained a new life, solving the problems of deterring Russia.
It is possible that the new security structure in Eurasia can also be sharpened for the tasks of deterrence.
Both Russia and China are in a state of rivalry and competition with the United States, although in the case of Russia they have actually entered an open phase, and in the case of China they have not yet manifested themselves in full growth. At least, the idea of jointly countering the double deterrence of the United States finds support in both Moscow and Beijing.
At the same time, building a security structure only on the opposition of the United States narrows the possible inclusiveness of the project. A number of Eurasian states rely on multi-vector policies and are unlikely to be ready to participate in a structure aimed at rivalry with the United States. The opposite may be a situation in which high inclusion will blur the security agenda, “round” it to general issues without specific concerted actions. So far, many questions remain about the parameters of the Eurasian security structure. They have to be addressed both at the level of diplomacy and at the level of dialogue between international experts of the countries concerned.
Source
https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/evraziyskaya-struktura-bezopasnosti/
