Mr Chair,
We congratulate you on your appointment to this responsible post. We hope that your able stewardship will contribute to building a constructive and de-politicized work and to meeting the challenge of ensuring effective implementation and strengthening of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BТWC), that the Review Conference is faced with. You can count on the support and cooperation of the delegation of the Russian Federation.
This year marks a momentous occasion – the 50th anniversary of the opening for signature of the BTWC. With its entry into force several years later, the Convention became the first international agreement to outlaw an entire category of weapons of mass destruction. It was a significant step forward in promoting general and complete disarmament that reduced the threat of biological agents being used for weapons purposes. The Russian Federation, as the depositary State of the BTWC, consistently implements all its provisions. However, even following half a century of the Convention’s implementation, we cannot say it is going on smoothly.
The Russian Federation has for a long time been openly expressing criticism and concern over military and biological activities carried out with the direct assistance and participation of the US military in laboratories outside the United States, including former Soviet Republics, far from the North American continent and close to Russia’s borders. Such activities are most often conducted indirectly through the Pentagon’s Threat Reduction Agency and private companies that are regular contractors of the US military.
The United States’ annual reporting under the BTWC Confidence-Building Measures, which were developed by States Parties “in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions”, lacks information on the programmes and projects implemented outside the US national territory, and on the financing thereof. Our repeated appeals to the American side to provide exhaustive explanation for such activities remain without proper and meaningful response. Such reticence and disregard for Russia’s claims on the part of the United States do nothing but support their validity.
A stark example of the abovementioned actions was the disclosure of the facts of military and biological activities performed by the United States and Ukraine on Ukrainian territory in violation of the BTWC. At the Consultative Meeting of States Parties to the BTWC on its Article V, Washington and Kiev failed to provide comprehensive answers to the legitimate questions we posed. We never received a proper and substantive response to the documents and evidence presented, which shed light on the true nature of interaction between the Pentagon and its contractors and the Ukrainian side in the field of military and biological activities.
In view of the destructive line taken by the United States and its allies, Russia’s complaint was not satisfied, and its proposal to conduct an international UNSC-sponsored investigation under Article VI of the BTWC was blocked. As a result, despite the fact that we have used all the mechanisms available under the Convention to resolve disputes, the current unacceptable situation, directly related to the implementation of the Convention, remains unresolved. We will be pressing the American and Ukrainian sides to rectify it.
This deplorable situation best confirms the urgent need to really strengthen the BTWC. Along with the overwhelming majority of States Parties, Russia is convinced that the effectiveness of the Convention would be greatly improved in the case of the adoption of a universal, legally binding, non‑discriminatory protocol, relating to all Articles of the Convention and involving an effective verification mechanism. Unfortunately, the development of such an instrument, which would make it possible to ensure reliable implementation of the BTWC and prevent its violation, has been unjustifiably blocked since 2001 precisely by the United States. We are in favour of resuming work on the protocol.
The Russian Federation has introduced and been promoting initiatives to really strengthen and institutionalize the BTWC regime. These include establishing an Open-ended Working Group to elaborate measures and proposals to strengthen the BTWC; creating mobile bio-medical units under the Convention to assist in case of biological weapons use and in combating infectious diseases of various origins, and a mechanism to investigate alleged violation of BTWC obligations under its Article VI; and establishing a Scientific Advisory Committee to assess developments in science and technology relevant to the Convention and to render advice to States Parties. The CSTO, CIS and SCO Member States back these proposals, as reflected in joint statements made earlier by their foreign ministers in support of the BTWC.
Russia, like many other countries, notes the importance of improving the BTWC’s Confidence-Building Measures, among other things, by including in the reporting form information on military and biological activities performed abroad by States Parties, in order to take outstanding questions about such activities off the table.
Mr Chair,
The Ninth Review Conference is our next chance to bring the international community together around a pragmatic, non-discriminatory and forward-looking agenda for improving the biological weapons prohibition regime and promoting cooperation for peaceful purposes. We have submitted the proposals in question to States Parties for their consideration. Russia calls on all interested parties to unite in constructive efforts for the sake of strengthening international security and in the interests of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
I thank you for your attention.
Source: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1840761/?lang=en
